This study examines the post-issue stock price performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from advanced and emerging Asian markets from 1991 to 2004. We provide a comparative assessment on the short-and long-term stock performance of Asian IPOs with comprehensive international evidence. We use several different methods to examine the robustness of IPO performance. Our results reveal that whilst there is initial underpricing in Asian IPOs, the existence of long run underperformance for the Asian IPOs depends resoundingly on the methodology used for assessment.
Introduction
The role and importance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in financial markets has changed over time and IPOs now represent a significant component of stock market activity. In Asian capital markets, initial public offerings (IPOs) perform one of the most crucial roles in the allocation of new capital. Over [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , Asia had the largest number of IPOs (2956), a lot more than North America (825), Europe (1098) and Australia and New Zealand (504) We find that initial underpricing in emerging Asian markets, China (202.63%), Korea (70.30%) and Malaysia (61.81%) exceed those in developed Asian markets, Hong Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) and Singapore (33.10%). The varying degrees of underpricing observed in different countries suggest that there may be some unique market-specific features that influences IPO underpricing. In particular, listing standards are generally higher in more developed stock markets, resulting in the lower levels of underperformance observed. There are various explanations for underpricing, with theories based on asymmetric information, agency costs, and signalling but Ritter and Welch (2002) point out there is no single dominant theoretical cause for underpricing. Hence, there is no universal IPO underpricing theory or hypothesis applicable for all times and across countries.
There are considerable variations in the measures of abnormal returns and the statistical tests used to detect long-run abnormal stock returns. In fact, Lyon (1997, 1999) have revealed that the method for calculating returns influences both the magnitude of the measured abnormal return as well as the size and power of the statistical tests. Following these studies, we have used 4 alternative methods to 1 Source: Thomson Financial examine the robustness of the long run performance of Asian IPOs: buy and hold return, controlling firm approach, reference portfolio, and the Fama and French (1993) model. The variety of methods used will enable a comprehensive view to be formed as to whether our findings are sensitive to the models employed. Our work is motivated by the ongoing discovery of biases in event studies involving long horizon returns. In our study, we are not directly interested in explaining long-run underperformance.
Rather, we are interested in explaining underperformance as a mis-measurement.
Our results show that the existence of long run underperformance for Asian IPOs depends on the methodology used. This finding supports Gompers and Lerner's (2003) argument that the relative performance of an IPO sample depends on the method used to examine performance. Moreover, Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that the characteristics of an IPO sample, in terms of the time period and the selection criteria, also contribute to the observed differences in the findings of studies on the long run performance of IPOs.
Our study makes the following contributions to the current literature on initial public offerings.
First, we focus on a large sample of Asian IPOs starting from 1991 to 2004. Unlike most existing studies which are limited to studying an individual country, our broader sample includes six countries in Asia and provides a new regional perspective. Second, we provide comparative analyses on Asian IPOs' stock performance on both aspects of initial underpricing and long term performance. These are important issues for portfolio managers, investors and policy makers alike.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) literature, whilst Section 3 and 4 describes the dataset and methodologies used respectively. Following this, Section 5 discusses the empirical results from different methods. In Section 6
we analyse Asian IPO performance in an asset pricing framework before finally concluding in Section 7.
Overview of the IPO Literature
Empirical studies traditionally show that there are two main patterns associated with IPOs: shortrun underpricing and long-run underperformance. The first significant study that attempts to measure performance based on stock returns is Ritter (1991) . In this study, issuing firms during 1975 to 1984 were matched by industry, size and indices. Returns were calculated using cumulative average adjusted return with monthly rebalancing, as well as buy-and-hold returns over three years. It was found that issuing firms substantially underperformed in the three years subsequent to going public. Ritter (1991) explains this by investors being overoptimistic about the prospects of firms that are issuing equity for the first time, and firms taking advantage of these 'window of opportunities'. IPO underperformance is not restricted to the United States. The study of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) finds that the IPO underpricing phenomenon exists in all 25 countries investigated, with higher IPO underpricing in developing markets.
Consequently, despite the fact that IPOs represent exploitable investment opportunities if the stocks are purchased at the price set in the initial offer, the empirical evidence seems to reveal that they should not be held in the long run.
Short-run underpricing is a persistent feature of the IPO market. Most models of underpricing based on asymmetric information share the prediction that underpricing is positively related to the degree information asymmetry. However, Ritter and Welch (2002) point out that these models have been overemphasized; there is no single dominant theoretical explanation for underpricing. Thus, it is not so much a matter of which model is right, but a matter of the relative importance of different models. One explanation can have greater importance for some firms at particular times.
In terms of long-term performance, studies on individual Asian market IPOs have mixed findings. Chun and Smith (2003) and Kim, Krinsky and Lee (1995) Indeed, the evidence on long run post-IPO performance is controversial, with researchers reporting contrasting results. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) , report that U.S IPO companies do experience significantly negative returns in the first three to five years following an IPO. In a more recent study on the U.S. market, Gompers and Lerner (2003) abnormal performance based on five alternative benchmarks using both an event-time approach and a calendar-time approach and find significant differences.
The degree of underperformance varies over time. Ritter and Welch (2002) showed that IPOs matched on size and Book-to-Market (BM) during [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] , averaged 3-year BHARs of -12.7 percent, but IPOs over [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] had an average BHAR of 11.6 percent. Similary, the Fama-French intercept for the [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] period was an insignificant -0.15 but it was a significant -0.48 during 1990 . Brav and Gompers (1997 find the level of performance related to the characteristics of the investment using a sample of IPO firms from 1972 to 1992. They replicate the Loughran and Ritter (1995) approach whilst extending it along several dimensions. They find that when issuing firms are matched on size and Book-to-Market ratios, IPOs do not underperform. In fact, underperformance is a characteristic of small, low book-to-market firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not. The results are supported by those of Ritter and Welch (2002) , who find that IPOs -when matched on size and Book-toMarket ratios -have only very modest underperformance. Additionally, when studying IPOs issued from 1973 and 2001, they indicate that the direction and magnitude of bias in long horizon studies can be sensitive to sample characteristics such as the Book-to-Market ratio, size, exchange listing, and the time period studied. They recognise that this is one of many difficulties faced by academics, and thus the extent of IPO abnormal performance remains unclear.
Data
In our paper we consider the initial public offerings of a sample of six Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore) between January 1, 1991 and December 31, 2004.
The offers included in our study have to meet the following three criteria: 1) Only common stock is involved in the offering and is being offered; 2) The stock is only traded in domestic currency; and 3) The stock is listed on the mainboard only (stocks traded in a secondary stock exchange is excluded from the analysis). 
Methodology
There exists a diverse range of IPO performance measures. Barber and Lyon (1997) , Kothari and Warner (1997) , Barber and Lyon (1999) , Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) all argue that the method of performance measurement influences both the magnitude of the abnormal returns as well as the size and power of the statistical test. Brav, Gecy and Gompers (2000) The control firm approach involves selecting firms that have similar risk characteristics and financial variables as the sample firms to control for common risk factors that are related to expected returns. As such, our matching is performed on the basis of size and Book-to-Market ratios. Loughran and Ritter (1995) Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) do not recommend BHARs because BHARs will overstate (understate) the real BHARs if any portion of the return horizon is positive (negative). However, in this paper, BHARs are used because: (i) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) neglect compounding effects whereas BHARs include compounding effects and produce returns that reflect investor experience;
and (ii) Barber and Lyon (1997) state that CARs are subject to a measurement bias, a new listing bias and a skewness bias. On the other hand, the BHAR which is calculated as the rate of return for the sample firm less the rate of return for a reference portfolio is subject to a new listing bias, a skewness bias and rebalancing bias. On balance, Barber and Lyon (1997) recommend BHARs in long-run studies because the test statistic is well specified and corresponds to an implementable trading strategy that does not make unrealistic assumptions about transaction cost (cost of frequent rebalancing). The BHAR for horizon τ is defined as:
where BHAR kτ is the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for k sets of comparison; ER it is the Buy-and-Hold investment return for the event firm i at day (month) t whereas CR it is the Buy-and-Hold investment return for the control firm j at day (month) t. The return windows we use to capture long-run performance are 3 years and 5 years respectively. To furnish insight into the performance of new securities since their IPO date, a 1 year return window is also evaluated. We define a year as 12 x 21 trading day intervals, hence a 1-year window has 252 trading days, a 3-year window has 756 trading days and 5-year window has 1,260 trading days.
For each event window, a conventional t-statistic based on the cross-sectional standard deviation of rated firms' abnormal returns is calculated, which is then used to test the significance of the compounding BHARs. The conventional t-statistic is defined as:
where BHAR p is the sample average and σ(BHAR p ) is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of the cumulative BHARs for n number of firms.
Results and Analyses

Comparing Initial Returns of Asian IPOs
In IPO initial returns in other geographical regions have shown a similar pattern of underpricing over long periods of time. Underpricing in the U.S. averages between 10 and 20 percent but there is a substantial degree of variation over time. The average first-day return was 15% during 1990-1998, 65% during 1999-2000, and 12% during 2001-2004. 6 During the "Hot Issue Period", in 1999 and 2000, the average IPO was underpriced by 71% and 56%. Ljungqvist (2005) report average initial IPO underprcing for 19 European countries over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and 8 Latin American countries over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . Among European markets, 18 out of the 19 markets had initial underpricing less than 40%;
and in Latin American countries, 7 out of 8 markets had initial underpricing less than 10%. Hence, our results on Asian IPOs show a substantially larger degree of average initial underpricing in comparision with U.S., the Europe, and Latin America. For Asian IPOs in our sample the average first-day return was 73% during 1990-1998, 70% during 1999-2000, and 57% during 2001-2004 . However, the more developed markets, Hong Kong (21.43%), Japan (34.04%) and Singapore (33.10%) experienced a similar level of underpricing compared with U.S. and European markets for example U.K (28%), Germany (35%) 6 Underpricing averages are based on the data available from Jay Ritter's website (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).
and Switzerland (17%). Furthermore, the extent of IPO underpricing is much higher in Asia than in Latin America.
We find that China has the highest level of initial returns in the Asian region in almost every year within the period studied. This may be explained by its distinctive corporate governance system, security laws and lack of legal enforcement. Our results indicate that the market adjusted first-day return is 202.63 percent with a t-statistic of 10.504 in line with previous studies on Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher (1999) , Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) and Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) ) that also find that there is evidence of Crisis they find that investors could earn 20.3 percent before the crisis and only 6.5 percent after the crisis.
Consistent with these studies, we find clear evidence of initial underpricing in Hong Kong IPO firms. The initial first-day return is 21.43 percent (t-statistic 2.844) which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The low degree of underpricing in Hong Kong is in line with that documented in other developed markets within the region like Japan (Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000) ) and Singapore (Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) ).
For all other developing markets in Asia, there is strong evidence of initial underpricing. 
Comparing Short and Long Term IPO performance based on alternative benchmarks
Next, we analyse the stock performance of Asian IPOs based on alternative benchmarks: 1) Local market Index, 2) Size and Book-to-Market matched control firms and 3) Reference Portfolios. Inspection of Table 2 reveals results differ when different benchmarks are adopted. In fact, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) claim that the analysis of long run abnormal returns is a treacherous game and this is precisely what we encounter in our study. Our results show the issue of benchmark misspecification is also a problem in Asian markets.
<Insert Table 2 Our results based on control firm approach suggests that Japanese IPOs perform poorly in the long run.
Similar to the control firm approach, the BHARs based on reference portfolios are negative and statistically significant in most event windows. In the long run, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are -20.9 percent and -36.4 percent with t-statistic of -4.228 and -5.007 respectively. Therefore, our results based on the reference portfolios suggest that there exists short-term and long-term underperformance of the Japanese IPOs. These results are consistent with Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000) , those findings implied that the Japanese IPOs performed more poorly than a portfolio of matching firms in a three-year investment horizon space. Again, different conclusions are drawn based on the different benchmarks.
Underperformance of the IPOs exists based on control firms and reference portfolios, while there is no such evidence for the market indices which are similar with Chinese findings.
There is no evidence of long-term underperformance of Korean IPO firms based on the Korean stock market index. Chun and Smith (2003) respectively. In our study, the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year BHARs are 40 percent (t-statistic 2.064), 36.31 percent (t-statistic 1.671) and 43.02 percent (t-statistic 1.993) respectively. Our BHARs are different to the corresponding BHARs found in Chun and Smith (2003) due to different sample periods studied.
However, we can confidently conclude that Korean IPOs outperform the stock market index over time.
There is no evidence of long-term underperformance based on control firm approach either. For the longrun horizon, the 3-year and 5-year BHARs are positive and statistically insignificant. Our BHARs based on the reference portfolio approach contrast with the results based on the market index and control firm approach. The BHAR is -14.6 percent after the first year, and drops to -57.6 percent after 3 years, and -60.3 percent 60 months after listing. Our results imply that there is some evidence of long-term underperformance of Korean IPOs based on the reference portfolio approach. Again, we achieve different results based on different benchmarks. In summary, based on the results across six major Asian financial centers, the market index approach suggests that short term outperformance occurs in all countries. Except for Hong Kong, we cannot observe negative and statistically significant BHARs in the long-run horizon based on the market index. The size-and Book-to-Market control firm approach indicates obvious long-term underperformance of the IPO firms in China, Hong Kong and Japan, while insignificant returns are found in the other three countries. Hence, we can infer that IPO firms perform poorly from the perspective of the reference portfolio approach. We find conflicting results are obtained when different benchmarks are adopted.
Explaining IPO returns with the Fama-French Three-Factor Model
We employ the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) in explaining the time-series variations of IPO returns over time. We assume an event period of five years. For each calendar month, we calculate the return on a portfolio composed of IPO firms within the last five years of the calendar month. The calendar-time return on this portfolio is used to estimate the following regression:
Where R pt is the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio, R ft is the monthly shortterm (three-month deposit) interest rate, R mt is the return on an equal-weighted market index, SMB t is the difference in the returns of portfolios of small stocks and big stocks, HML t is the difference in the returns of portfolios of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. The portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (Market Capitalization) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of Book-to-Market. The size breakpoint for year t is the median (Market Capitalization) market equity at the end of June of year t. Book-to-Market for June of year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by size for December of t-1. The Book-to-Market breakpoints are the 30 th and 70 th (country) percentiles.
<Insert Table 3 here> The results of each country obtained by using the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) confirms the non-existence of long-run abnormal returns (underperformance). The intercept takes negative but insignificant values.
Nevertheless, only the market premium is significant. For countries like China, Malaysia, and Korea, they have a positive factor loading for SMB, indicating that the outperformance (relative to the market index) of IPO firms is due to the small firm effects. And for other countries, as neither the SMB nor HML have statistically significant coefficients. Fama-French regressions tend to have negative intercepts for portfolios of small growth (low Book-to-Market) stocks, whether or not IPOs are included in the portfolio (Brav and Gompers, 1997) . The model is biased towards finding IPO underperformance since a large fraction of IPOs fall into this category. As Fama(1998) highlights, the number of firms in the IPO portfolio changes through time, creating residual heteroskedasticity that can affect inferences based on the intercept.
In summary, when using Buy-and-Hold returns based on market Indices, there exists abnormal returns that are occasionally significant in certain periods. Nevertheless, when using the other two methodologies -calendar-time portfolios and the Fama and French three-factor model, which are based on the calculation of mean monthly calendar-time returns -the existence of long-run underperformance is supported. The magnitude of the long-run abnormal returns depends on the methodology and the benchmark used for the return adjustment on IPOs.
Consequently, the existence or otherwise of long-run underperformance in IPOs is a question of methodology that depends on the form of estimating the long-run abnormal returns. In short, as argued by Fama (1998) , all the methods used for the estimation of abnormal returns are subject to problems arising from the poor specification of the models and no method is able to minimise these problems for all classes of events. Even models, such as the Fama French three-factor model and benchmark matched on size and Book-to-Market ratio, controlling for variations in the returns influenced by these two variables, give rise to different estimations of the abnormal returns (Fama, 1998) 8 .
Conclusion
This study provides comparative pan-Asian analyses on the stock performance of Asian IPOs Table 1 Initial Returns of IPOs among Asian countries Table 1 shows the number of and first-day raw returns (in percentages) of the IPO firms across the six financial markets in the Asian Region over the period from 1st Jan 1991 to 31st Dec 2004. The first-day initial raw return is defined as the difference between the IPO's first-day closing price and the offer price divided by the offer price. T-statistics are shown in brackets. ** and * denotes significance at the 1 and 5% levels respectively. 
